Self-disorders in schizophrenia as disorders of transparency: an exploratory account

Phenomenological research on schizophrenia often views self-disorders as disturbances of the 'minimal self,' the most basic sense of self. This paper identifies challenges for that view, including problems with the minimal self being considered essential to conscious experience and the fact that some schizophrenia patients experience an exaggerated, not diminished, sense of self. The authors then explore an alternative 'transparency-view' of consciousness, which treats self-awareness as a transparent quality of experience rather than a separate entity. They argue this view can account for loss-of-self experiences, aligns with the concept of hyper-reflexivity (excessive self-awareness), and explains instances of increased selfhood. The paper suggests this alternative may offer advantages for research and clinical approaches.

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Abstract

Understanding alterations of selfhood (termed self-disorders or self-disturbances) that are considered typical of the schizophrenia-spectrum is a central focus of phenomenological research. The currently most influential way of phenomenologically conceiving self-disorders in schizophrenia is as disorders of the so-called most basic or ‘minimal self’. In this paper, we first highlight some challenges for the minimal self-view of self-disorders, focusing on (1) problems arising from the supposedly ‘essential’ or ‘universal’ nature of minimal self with respect to phenomenal awareness and (2) the critical implications of alterations of self-experience in schizophrenia that involve heightened or exaggerated sense of self. In the second part, we tentatively explore how a (non-egological) transparency-view of consciousness may offer an alternative way of understanding the experiential abnormalities involved in self-disorders in schizophrenia. We discuss how such a transparency-view (1) may account for loss-of-self experiences; (2) is compatible with the key notion of ‘hyper-reflexivity’; and (3) can help explain instances of self-disorder involving increased sense of self. In conclusion, we consider some possible advantages of this alternative view for research on self-disorders and clinical approaches.