Prakāśa. A few reflections on the Advaitic understanding of consciousness as presence and its relevance for philosophy of mind
Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences August 14, 2020 DOI: 10.1007/s11097-020-09690-2 via Semantic Scholar
Summary
AI-generated from the abstractConsciousness, according to Advaita Vedānta, is not itself an object of introspection but is the pure manifestation (prakāśa) that makes all contents of consciousness known. This paper argues that contemporary philosophy of mind, by treating consciousness as a special kind of object (qualia), makes the anti-materialist claim vulnerable to the materialist reply that the difference between mental and physical is merely epistemological. The paper contends that this materialist move leads to circularity or infinite regress regarding the nature of givenness or manifestation itself.
Study at a glance
| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Keywords | Psychology Philosophy |
| Citations | 11 |
| Key finding | Treating consciousness as an object (qualia) allows a materialist reply that the mental-physical difference is merely epistemological, but this reply leads to circularity or infinite regress regarding manifestation itself. |
Abstract
For Advaita Vedānta, consciousness is to be distinguished from all contents of consciousness that might be introspectively detectable: It is precisely consciousness of whatever contents it is conscious of and not itself one of these contents. Its only nature is, Advaita holds, prakāśa (manifestation); in itself it is devoid of any content or structure and can never become an object. This paper elaborates on this kind of understanding of consciousness in order to next explain why it might be fruitful for developing a clear understanding of the nature of the so-called problem of consciousness. Today’s philosophy of mind tends to conceive of consciousness in terms of qualia, thereby taking it as a special kind of (introspectively accessible) object. This renders the antimaterialist claim of the distinctness of consciousness from all physical (publicly accessible) features vulnerable to the materialist reply that the difference in question might be a merely epistemological matter, i.e., a matter of different modes of givenness without difference in what is thus given. This move, however – this paper argues –, is impossible without resulting in circularity or infinite regress with regard to consciousness in the sense of givenness (manifestation) itself.