Phenomenology and phenomenalism: a comment on Chan and Chen’s “physical nature lives!”

This commentary argues that Chan and Chen's defense of compatibility between phenomenology and naturalism inadvertently shifts the meaning of experience, which can be interpreted as a phenomenalist version of the Argument from Sparse Bundles. Drawing on Husserl's work, the author contends that phenomenology does not entail phenomenalism because perceptual experience is directly directed toward objects, not toward sensory data. The commentary aims to strengthen the target article's central argument rather than challenge it.

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Abstract

This commentary examines Chan and Chen’s ( 2025 ) argument for the compatibility between phenomenology and naturalism, focusing on their response to the Argument from Sparse Bundles. It argues that the target article involves a shift in the meaning of experience, but that this shift can be understood as an interpretation of a specifically phenomenalist version of ASB. Drawing on Husserl’s own text, the commentary further argues that phenomenology does not lead to phenomenalism, since perceptual experience is directly directed toward objects rather than sensory data. Its aim is therefore to strengthen, rather than challenge, the target article’s central argument.