Can Autonomous Agents Without Phenomenal Consciousness Be Morally Responsible?

Some philosophers argue that unconscious autonomous agents could, in principle, be held morally responsible. This view is supported by a common line of reasoning, which the author calls the Extension Argument. The author contends that this argument, as currently formulated, is insufficient to prove that such agents can be morally responsible. The argument faces particularly strong ethical objections, and its epistemological foundations are weak, partly because the justifications for its premises conflict with each other.

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Abstract

It is an increasingly popular view among philosophers that moral responsibility can, in principle, be attributed to unconscious autonomous agents. This trend is already remarkable in itself, but it is even more interesting that most proponents of this view provide more or less the same argument to support their position. I argue that as it stands, the Extension Argument, as I call it, is not sufficient to establish the thesis that unconscious autonomous agents can be morally responsible. I attempt to show that the Extension Argument should overcome especially strong ethical considerations; moreover, its epistemological grounds are not too solid, partly because the justifications of its premises are in conflict.