Systems Views of Gender/Sex Require Enactivism: Connecting Fausto-Sterling's Approach to Embodied Cognition to the "Linguistic Bodies" Paradigm

The sex/gender distinction has been both useful and restrictive for interdisciplinary research. Alternative frameworks aim to overcome or redefine these categories, including biosocial interaction, gender/sex entanglement, and dynamic developmental systems. This paper supports modifications of dynamic systems approaches, arguing that the 'linguistic bodies' paradigm provides theoretical resources to distinguish and connect gender structuration, gender identity, and their material dimensions. The author examines Fausto-Sterling's connection of her developmental systems approach with embodied cognition theory, acknowledging its strength but showing it is limited by representationalist understanding. The author expands the view that gender requires participatory sense-making, linking personal, intersubjective, socio-structural, and material dimensions without positing representationalist agents.

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Abstract

The distinction between sex and gender has been both beneficial and limiting for interdisciplinary research on gender/sex (Shattuck-Heidorn and Richardson 2019; Paulitz 2021; Oudshoorn 2003; Mikkola 2017). In response, alternative conceptual frameworks aim to either overcome or redefine sex and gender: from approaches to bio social interactions (Haslanger 2017) to gender/sex entanglement (Barad 2007; Braidotti 2002) to dynamic and developmental systems approaches (Fausto-Sterling 2012; 2005; Oyama 2000; Prum 2023; Griffiths 2021). In this context, emergent social critical and (trans) feminist work is turning to 4EA cognition theories. This paper supports these modifications of dynamic systems approaches to sex and gender. My main argument is that the ‘linguistic bodies’ paradigm (Di Paolo et al. 2018) can provide much needed theoretical resources to distinguish and connect gender structuration, gender identity, and their material dimensions. Specifically, I look at Fausto-Sterling’s recent connection of her developmental systems approach to gender/sex with embodied cognition theory (Fausto-Sterling 2020; 2021; 2025). Acknowledging the strength of her view, I show that it is limited by its representationalist understanding. Expanding the view that gender requires participatory sense making(Thinius 2021; 2022; Forthcoming), I link personal, intersubjective, socio-structural, and material dimensions without positing representationalist agents in the way Fausto-Sterling seems to imply.