The Illusion of Presence: ontological limits of algorithmic mediation in contemporary subjectivity

Algorithmic hyperconnectivity increases the quantity of contact between people but empties out the shared vulnerability that makes genuine human bonds possible. Drawing on phenomenology and enactivism, the essay argues that algorithmically mediated presence creates a structural illusion: subjects experience connection without genuine exposure, proximity without risk, and communication without true encounter. The implications of this illusion are discussed for clinical psychology, philosophy of mind, and understanding contemporary suffering.

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Abstract

This essay examines the ontological limits of algorithmic mediation in the constitution of contemporary subjectivity. Drawing on the critiques of Han (2015, 2022), Zuboff (2019), and Turkle (2011), and grounded in the phenomenology of Merleau-Ponty (1945) and the enactivism of Di Paolo (2005) and Fuchs and De Jaegher (2009), the central argument holds that technical hyperconnectivity quantitatively expands contact between subjects while qualitatively emptying the shared vulnerability that constitutes the condition of possibility for genuine human bonds. It is proposed that algorithmically mediated presence produces a structural illusion: the subject experiences connection without genuine exposure, proximity without risk, and communication without encounter. The implications for psychological clinical practice, philosophy of mind, and the understanding of contemporary suffering are discussed throughout the text.Keywords: subjectivity; algorithmic mediation; presence; vulnerability; contemporary suffering; philosophy of mind.