RADICAL ENACTIVISM AND SELF-KNOWLEDGE
Kriterion: Revista de Filosofia September 1, 2018 DOI: 10.1590/0100-512x2018n14105gr
Summary
AI-generated from the abstractA middle-ground account of self-knowledge is proposed, reconciling perceptual models (where mental states are accessed via causal mechanisms) with rationalist models (where self-knowledge is constituted by rational agency). By analogy with how sensorimotor abilities support perceptual knowledge, self-knowledge is characterized as an exercise of action-oriented and action-orienting abilities. This view preserves the privileged access typically associated with self-knowledge while avoiding an unbridgeable gap between knowledge of oneself and knowledge of other minds.
Study at a glance
| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Citations | 4 |
| Key finding | Self-knowledge can be understood as an exercise of action-oriented and action-orienting abilities, satisfying privileged access without creating an insurmountable gap between self-knowledge and knowledge of other minds. |
Abstract
ABSTRACT I propose a middle-ground between a perceptual model of self-knowledge, according to which the objects of self-awareness (one's beliefs, desires, intentions and so on) are accessed through some kind of causal mechanism, and a rationalist model, according to which self-knowledge is constituted by one's rational agency. Through an analogy with the role of the exercises of sensorimotor abilities in rationally grounded perceptual knowledge, self-knowledge is construed as an exercise of action-oriented and action-orienting abilities. This view satisfies the privileged access condition usually associated with self-knowledge without entailing an insurmountable gap between self- knowledge and knowledge of other minds.