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Converging enactivisms: radical enactivism meets linguistic bodies

Giovanni Rolla, Jeferson Huffermann

Adaptive Behavior June 10, 2021 DOI: 10.1177/10597123211020782 via Semantic Scholar

Summary

AI-generated from the abstract

Two branches of the enactivist research program—Radically Enactive Cognition and Linguistic Bodies—converge on the idea that the normativity of human cognitive capacities rests on shared know-how. Radical enactivism emphasizes the diachronic dimension of shared know-how, while linguistic bodies emphasize the synchronic one. Because know-how is normative, it implies basic content: the content of successful ongoing interactions between agent(s) and environment. Basic content does not involve accuracy conditions or representational content, thus avoiding the Hard Problem of Content. This account aligns with the claim that participatory sense-making in linguistic exchanges is continuous with biological organization and sensorimotor engagements.

Study at a glance

Characteristics Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed
Keywords Computer science Psychology Linguistics Philosophy
Citations 20
Key finding Two enactivist approaches converge on shared know-how as the basis for the normativity of human cognitive capacities, implying basic content without representational content.

Abstract

We advance a critical examination of two recent branches of the enactivist research program, namely, Radically Enactive Cognition and Linguistic Bodies. We argue that, although these approaches may look like diverging views within the wider enactivist program, when appraised in a conciliatory spirit, they can be interpreted as developing converging ideas. We examine how the notion of know-how figures in them to show an important point of convergence, namely, that the normativity of human cognitive capacities rests on shared know-how. Radical enactivism emphasizes the diachronic dimension of shared know-how, and linguistic bodies emphasize the synchronic one. Given that know-how is a normative notion, it is subject to success conditions. We then argue it implies basic content, which is the content of the successful ongoing interactions between agent(s) and environment. Basic content does not imply accuracy conditions and representational content, so it evades Hutto and Myin’s Hard Problem of Content. Moreover, this account is amenable to the central claim by Di Paolo et al. that the participatory sense-making relations at play in linguistic exchanges are explained in continuity with explanations of biological organization and sensorimotor engagements.

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