The Body in Action

Predictive processing, a theory of brain function, can be reconciled with embodied cognition, which emphasizes the role of the body and environment in shaping thought. Embodied cognition typically includes four theses: that the body constitutes cognition, that cognition does not require internal representations, that cognition and emotion are inseparable, and that cognition is shaped by cultural and environmental factors. Predictive processing, often described in terms of inference and internal models, initially seems to conflict with these ideas. However, this tension can be resolved, and it is possible to accept predictive processing while endorsing all four embodied cognition theses.

Study at a glance

Abstract

Abstract This chapter considers the possible convergence of predictive processing and embodied cognition. It is argued that the embodied view of cognition comprises a subset (if not all) of the following theses: (1) the constitutive thesis, (2) the nonrepresentational thesis, (3) the cognitive-affective inseparability thesis, and (4) the metaplasticity thesis. It is then argued that predictive processing is prima facie at odds with some (if not all) of these embodied cognition theses. The reason is that predictive processing is often understood in epistemic, inferential, and representational terms, promoting an internalist and skepticism-prone view of the mind-world relation. The chapter proceeds to establish that this perceived tension between predictive processing and embodied cognition can be overcome. The chapter concludes that it is possible to accept predictive processing and endorse all four theses central to the embodied view of cognition.