Representation hunger: Reformulating the “problem‐domain” of truly complex cognition

The 4E-cognition movement (embodied, embedded, extended, enactive) increasingly questions whether internal representations are needed for complex thinking, particularly for cognition about absent or abstract objects—termed representation-hungry cognition (RHC). Critics reject the concept of RHC entirely. The author defends RHC while reformulating it to emphasize how external tools and cultural practices (enculturation) shape cognition. The argument concludes that critics must either accept that internal representations generate novel mental content or allow that such content can be internalized without depending on external representational vehicles.

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Abstract

The rapid growth of 4E‐cognition has led to increased skepticism about the role of internal representations in understanding complex cognitive tasks. Critics challenge the idea of representation‐hungry cognition (RHC), rejecting the notion that thinking about absent or abstract objects requires internal representations. Despite criticisms, I argue that RHC remains relevant to understanding what makes cognition truly complex. My goal is to defend RHC while reformulating it to highlight how external vehicles shape cognition through processes of enculturation. I conclude that critics must either accept internal representations in the production of novel content or allow that content be internalized independently of external representational vehicles.