Social phenomena as a challenge to the scaling-up problem

The scaling-up problem challenges radical embodied cognition (REC) to explain supposedly complex, representation-hungry phenomena. This paper argues that sorting cognitive phenomena by inherent complexity or representation-hunger is untenable, using social phenomena as a test case. Two opposing views—that sociality is the most representation-hungry (Clark & Toribio) or a non-representational resource (radical enactivists)—show the difficulty of placing sociality in a representational hierarchy. Examining dual-process models in social psychology reveals a distinction between task complexity and cognitive requirements, undermining the essentialism behind representation-hunger. Radical enactivism's encounter with social theory offers a non-representational account of institutions. The paper concludes that either the scaling-up problem is invalid in its hierarchical form, or REC has already scaled up to social phenomena.

Study at a glance

Abstract

The “scaling-up” problem concerns radical embodied cognition’s (REC) supposed inability to extend its explanatory reach beyond simple cognitive phenomena. This paper questions the problem’s main assumption, that is, the possibility of sorting phenomena according to their inherent cognitive complexity or representation-hunger. To do so, I focus on a class of phenomena whose degree of representation-hunger has been much debated: social phenomena (and their cognitive correlates). Some, like Clark and Toribio (1994), consider social phenomena the absolute top of representation-hunger, while others, like radical enactivists, conceive of sociality as a non-representational resource; two opposite views which demonstrate how hard it is to place sociality somewhere in a representational hierarchy. An exploration into two social disciplines provides reasons to question the tenability of the scaling-up problem in the case of social phenomena and hence in general. The long debate in social psychology over dual-process models of cognition suggests distinguishing between the complexity of a task and its putative cognitive requirements, therefore rejecting that form of cognitive-task essentialism inherent in the idea of representation-hunger. The recent encounter of radical enactivism with social theory provides, on the other hand, a non-representational explanation of institutional phenomena. In the end, the paper suggests that one of the following must hold: either the scaling-up problem is untenable in its traditional (hierarchical) understanding or radical enactivism has already scaled up to social phenomena, understood as the pinnacle of representation-hunger.