What Is It Like To Be in a Pure Perceptual State?

The idea that perception can occur entirely free from cognitive influence—pure perception—is examined and found unsupportable. Pure perception is often characterized as having nonconceptual content, an iconic format, and a unique phenomenology. The paper argues that this concept is untenable: introspection, psychological observation, and neuroanatomy all fail to provide empirical evidence for the existence of such pure perceptual states. No grounds were found to individuate these states, and specific theoretical worries further undermine the notion.

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Abstract

The idea of pure perception —perception without any cognitive influence— is central to the science and philosophy of perception. For many, to be in a pure perceptual state is to be in a state whose content is nonconceptual, whose format is iconic, and whose phenomenology is unique. This paper explores this possibility and finds that the idea of pure perception, at least when defined in these terms, is untenable. Besides significant specific worries derived from the properties characterizing these states, I have not found empirical grounds indicating the possibility of individuating these states: neither looking inside oneself (introspection), nor looking inside others (psychology), nor looking inside the brain (neuroanatomy), suggests the existence of pure perceptual mental states.