Cognitive Penetrability of Perception

Perception and cognition are typically considered distinct: seeing differs from believing. The question of whether beliefs and thoughts can directly influence what one sees is known as the cognitive penetration of perception. This paper analyzes the phenomenon, its theoretical implications for philosophy of science, epistemology, philosophy of mind, and cognitive science, and reviews experimental results and their interpretations. It concludes by proposing constraints for analyses and definitions of cognitive penetrability.

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Abstract

Abstract Perception is typically distinguished from cognition. For example, seeing is importantly different from believing. And while what one sees clearly influences what one thinks, it is debatable whether what one believes and otherwise thinks can influence, in some direct and non‐trivial way, what one sees. The latter possible relation is the cognitive penetration of perception . Cognitive penetration, if it occurs, has implications for philosophy of science, epistemology, philosophy of mind, and cognitive science. This paper offers an analysis of the phenomenon, its theoretical consequences, and a variety of experimental results and possible interpretations of them. The paper concludes by proposing some constraints for analyses and definitions of cognitive penetrability.