Suárez and Some Baroque Scotists on the Perceptual Self-Awareness

This article examines whether sensory self-awareness—perceiving one's own acts of sensing—requires special mental representations (sensible species). Aristotle offered two different views on this in On the Soul and On Sleep and Waking, which set the medieval debate. The author analyzes Francisco Suárez's account, which cannot be supported by Scotus's own writings, and shows it was rejected by the Scotists Mastri and Belluto and by Hugh McCaghwell in one of his conclusions. However, McCaghwell's second position is Suárezian, indicating that Suárez's philosophy of perception was positively received by some seventeenth-century Scotists.

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Abstract

In this article I deal with the topic of perceptual self-awareness, focusing on whether a plausible account of sensory self-perception having exterior sensations as its objects requires sensible species representing these acts. I first introduce Aristotle’s two distinct views from On the Soul and On Sleep and Waking as defining the scholastic status quaestionis, then bring in Francisco Suárez’s (1548–1617), Bartholomeo Mastri’s (1602–1673) and Bonaventura Belluto’s (1600–1676), and Hugh McCaghwell’s (1571–1626) accounts. I show, first, that Suárez’s view, which cannot be substantiated by Scotus’s littera, is rejected by Mastri/Belluto and by McCaghwell in one of his conclusions. Second, I argue that McCaghwell’s second tenet is to be assessed as Suarezian. This shows that Suárez’s philosophy of perception was positively received also by seventeenth-century Scotists.