The fiction of phenomenal intentionality

The paper argues that phenomenal intentionality—the idea that intentional states have a special kind of conscious feel—does not exist. The author claims that advocates mistakenly apply the concept of "what it is like" (WIL) to intentional states in the same way as to sensory states, but this application is asymmetrical and invalid. While agreeing that consciousness must be involved in intentionality, the author contends that the arguments for phenomenal intentionality fail due to this asymmetry. Instead, the paper proposes that there is a phenomenology of intentionality—a conscious experience associated with intentional states—but not a distinct phenomenal intentionality. The argument is grounded in a critical overview of recent philosophy of mind.

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Abstract

This paper argues that there is no such thing as “phenomenal intentionality”. The arguments used by its advocates rely upon an appeal to “what it is like” (WIL) to attend on some occasion to one’s intentional state. I argue that there is an important asymmetry in the application of the WIL phenomenon to sensory and intentional states. Advocates of “phenomenal intentionality” fail to recognize this, but this asymmetry undermines their arguments for phenomenal intentionality. The broader issue driving the advocacy of phenomenal intentionality is the belief that consciousness must somehow be implicated in intentionality. With this I agree. But because of the asymmetry of application of WIL, the path chosen by advocates of phenomenal intentionality to secure this conclusion cannot succeed. A brief overview of recent philosophy of mind explains the temptation to take this wrong path. Fortunately, there are other routes that implicate consciousness in intentionality. In consequence, though there is no phenomenal intentionality, there is a phenomenology of intentionality.