Helmholtz on Perceptual Properties

Hermann von Helmholtz denied that humans can perceive mind-independent properties of external objects, a position called Ignorance. While this might suggest subjectivism—that we only perceive properties of our own mental representations—the author argues Helmholtz instead endorsed relationalism: the properties we perceive are all relational properties, not monadic properties of either the subject or the object. The paper clarifies this by examining neglected terminological distinctions in Helmholtz's writings, showing how these distinctions make sense of his relationalist view. Helmholtz's work on perception fundamentally shaped Neo-Kantian movements and continues to influence psychology and analytic philosophy.

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Abstract

Hermann von Helmholtz’s work on perceptual science had a fundamental impact on Neo-Kantian movements in the late nineteenth century, and his influence continues to be felt in psychology and analytic philosophy of perception. As is widely acknowledged, Helmholtz denied that we can perceive mind-independent properties of external objects, a view I label Ignorance. Given his commitment to Ignorance, Helmholtz might seem to be committed to a subjectivism according to which we only perceive properties of our own representations. Against this, I argue that for Helmholtz, the properties we perceive are not monadic properties of either the subject or the object. Rather, Helmholtz endorsed a relationalism about the properties we perceive: the properties of objects we perceive are all relational properties. I then suggest that once we take into account oft-neglected terminological distinctions in Helmholtz’s corpus, we are better able to make sense of his commitment to relationalism.