Having Things in View

Relationalism (naïve realism) holds that the phenomenal character of conscious perception is partly constituted by the perceived items themselves, not by representations of them. The austere version denies that perceiving involves representing; representation only occurs later through judgment. However, empirical evidence shows that unconscious perceptual judgment can precede conscious perception, and that perception can occur unconsciously. This challenges the austere view. The author argues for a revised austere relationalism based on the Purely Relational theory of perception, which accommodates the evidence and eliminates the need for the obscure concept of unanalysable conscious acquaintance.

Study at a glance

Abstract

Relationalism about perception (aka naïve realism) construes the phenomenal character of conscious perception as at least partially constituted by the perceived items. According to the “austere” forms of this view, perceiving does not consist in representing the perceived items as being a certain way. Instead, austere relationalists maintain that representing a perceived item occurs in response to conscious perception of that item and consists in judging it to be a certain way. But this is called into question by empirical evidence suggesting that conscious perception can be preceded by unconscious perceptual judgment and that perception can occur unconsciously. In response, the austere relationalist can either contest the evidence, or (re)develop their view in a way that makes it compatible with the evidence. I argue for a version of the latter strategy that consists in specifying austere relationalism in terms of the Purely Relational theory of perception. The resulting account has original and interesting ramifications for perception and perceptual consciousness. Most notably, it allows the austere relationalist to dispense with the obscure notion of unanalysable conscious acquaintance.