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Comparing theories of consciousness: why it matters and how to do it

S. H. del Pin, Zuzanna Skóra, K. Sandberg, M. Overgaard, M. Wierzchoń

Neuroscience of Consciousness January 1, 2021 DOI: 10.1093/nc/niab019 via Semantic Scholar

Summary

AI-generated from the abstract

Most research on consciousness tests only a single theory, and when theories are compared the comparisons are often verbal and non-systematic, which may contribute to the lack of convergence in the field. The authors argue that meaningful comparisons require evaluating whether predictions are parallel or contrasting, and they examine why direct comparisons are rare, suggesting the unique nature of consciousness itself as a possible explanation. They conclude that the field should embrace this uniqueness and specify the features a theory of consciousness must account for.

Study at a glance

Characteristics Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed
Keywords Medicine Psychology Philosophy
Key finding Most consciousness research focuses on a single theory, and comparisons between theories are rarely systematic, which may hinder theoretical convergence.

Abstract

Abstract The theoretical landscape of scientific studies of consciousness has flourished. Today, even multiple versions of the same theory are sometimes available. To advance the field, these theories should be directly compared to determine which are better at predicting and explaining empirical data. Systematic inquiries of this sort are seen in many subfields in cognitive psychology and neuroscience, e.g. in working memory. Nonetheless, when we surveyed publications on consciousness research, we found that most focused on a single theory. When ‘comparisons’ happened, they were often verbal and non-systematic. This fact in itself could be a contributing reason for the lack of convergence between theories in consciousness research. In this paper, we focus on how to compare theories of consciousness to ensure that the comparisons are meaningful, e.g. whether their predictions are parallel or contrasting. We evaluate how theories are typically compared in consciousness research and related subdisciplines in cognitive psychology and neuroscience, and we provide an example of our approach. We then examine the different reasons why direct comparisons between theories are rarely seen. One possible explanation is the unique nature of the consciousness phenomenon. We conclude that the field should embrace this uniqueness, and we set out the features that a theory of consciousness should account for.

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