Hard criteria for empirical theories of consciousness

Consciousness research has produced many competing theories, ranging from computational to quantum approaches, more than in other natural sciences. This abundance may stem from a lack of clear criteria for how empirical data should constrain such theories. The authors argue consciousness is empirically well-defined and propose a checklist of criteria that empirical theories of consciousness must address. They review 13 influential theories against these criteria, revealing their relative strengths and weaknesses from a strictly empirical perspective.

Study at a glance

Abstract

ABSTRACT Consciousness is now a well-established field of empirical research. A large body of experimental results has been accumulated and is steadily growing. In parallel, many Theories of Consciousness (ToCs) have been proposed. These theories are diverse in nature, ranging from computational to neurophysiological and quantum theoretical approaches. This contrasts with other fields of natural science, which host a smaller number of competing theories. We suggest that one reason for this abundance of extremely different theories may be the lack of stringent criteria specifying how empirical data constrains ToCs. First, we argue that consciousness is a well-defined topic from an empirical point of view and motivate a purely empirical stance on the quest for consciousness. Second, we present a checklist of criteria that, we propose, empirical ToCs need to cope with. Third, we review 13 of the most influential ToCs and subject them to the criteria. Our analysis helps to situate these different ToCs in the theoretical landscapeand sheds light on their strengths and weaknesses from a strictly empirical point of view.