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The Stream of Consciousness: VIII. James's Ejective Consciousness (First Part)

Thomas Natsoulas

Imagination, Cognition and Personality June 1, 1995 DOI: 10.2190/56fk-8wa4-9vbq-4xvv

Summary

AI-generated from the abstract

This philosophical article examines William James's concept of "ejective" consciousness from his work The Principles of Psychology. James proposes that during altered states, and possibly at other times, mental occurrences can split off from an individual's primary stream of consciousness, forming a second stream that is equally conscious and personal. While James rejects the existence of nonconscious mental occurrences that lack inner awareness, he accepts that a second stream of consciousness can exist alongside the first. Each stream has inner awareness of its own durational components, but can only have inferential knowledge of the other stream.

Study at a glance

Characteristics Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed
Key finding William James countenances a second stream of consciousness that is conscious and personal, with inner awareness of its own durational components, but only inferential knowledge of the first stream.

Abstract

The present series concerning the stream of consciousness continues with two articles that examine James's conception of “ejective” consciousness in The Principles. During certain altered states, and perhaps at other times as well, mental-occurrence instances take place that are not part of the individual's original stream of consciousness. Usually, if not always, such “split-off” mental-occurrence instances comprise a second stream, which, according to James, is no less conscious and personal than the original stream is. However, the durational components of the second stream are distinct from nonconscious mental occurrences. Whereas James argues against the existence of nonconscious mental occurrences, of which there can be no inner awareness by definition, James does countenance a second stream of consciousness, of which the first stream can have only inferential knowledge, and vice versa. Both streams include inner awareness of their own basic durational components.

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