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The Stream of Consciousness: IX. James's Ejective Consciousness (Second Part)

Thomas Natsoulas

Imagination, Cognition and Personality October 1, 1995 DOI: 10.2190/8dgd-lubk-mrrq-95uv

Summary

AI-generated from the abstract

William James's concept of 'ejective consciousness' holds that in altered states, mental events can split off from a person's main stream of consciousness to form a second, equally conscious and personal stream. Unlike nonconscious mental occurrences, which James argues cannot exist because they lack inner awareness, this second stream has its own inner awareness of its basic durational components. The original stream can only know the second stream indirectly, through inference, and the same applies in reverse. James thus distinguishes between split-off conscious streams and the nonconscious mental, which he rejects.

Study at a glance

Characteristics Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed
Key finding James countenances a second stream of consciousness in altered states, which is conscious and personal, unlike nonconscious mental occurrences which he argues against.

Abstract

As in the preceding article of the present series, I continue to examine William James's thought in The Principles of Psychology regarding what he there called “ejective consciousness.” James held that, in certain altered states, and perhaps at other times as well, mental occurrences may take place that are not components of the individual's original stream of consciousness. Usually if not always, such “split-off” occurrences comprise a second stream, which, according to James, is no less conscious and personal than the original stream is. However, the components of the second stream must be distinguished from nonconscious mental occurrences. Whereas James argues at some length against the existence of the nonconscious mental, of which there cannot be any inner awareness by definition, James does countenance the unusual presence of a second stream of consciousness, of which the first stream can have knowledge only inferentially, and vice versa. Both streams include inner awareness of their own basic durational components.

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