Materialism, Minimal Emergentism, and the Hard Problem of Consciousness

The chapter presents and defends minimal emergentism, a non-materialist metaphysical position that posits brute inter-level necessitation relations (either nomically or metaphysically necessary) between physical and mental phenomena. It contrasts this view with stronger forms of emergentism and outlines powerful challenges to materialism arising from features of human consciousness. The argument concludes that minimal emergentism offers a viable and theoretically appealing alternative to materialism for understanding the mind.

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Abstract

AbstractThis chapter formulates and motivates the current favored articulation of the metaphysical doctrine of materialism. It describes an alternative metaphysical position called minimal emergentism, which has two versions; and then contrasts it with stronger kinds of emergentism. Minimal emergentism posits certain inter-level necessitation relations — either nomically necessary connections, or metaphysically necessary connections — that are metaphysically brute. The chapter sets forth what it takes to be some very powerful challenges to materialism — challenges involving features of human consciousness. Finally, the chapter argues that in light of these challenges, minimal emergentism is a viable and theoretically appealing non-materialist metaphysic of mind.