Emergence and Consciousness

Emergentism, the idea that higher-level properties arise from lower-level ones in a way that is not fully reducible, is often defined in epistemological terms, which leads to confusion about its metaphysical validity. This paper offers purely metaphysical definitions of emergentism and property emergence, examining the necessitation relation between base and emergent properties. It argues that emergentism implies a Humean view of causation. The paper then presents arguments against emergentism, both as a general metaphysics and as an account of consciousness, claiming it makes implausible claims about how the world works. It notes that most current property dualists hold views effectively identical to classical emergentism, minus its historical commitment to novel emergent forces.

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Abstract

AbstractMost definitions of radical emergentism characterize it epistemologically. This leads to misunderstandings and makes it hard to assess the doctrine's metaphysical worth. This paper puts forward purely metaphysical characterizations of emergentism and property emergence. It explores the nature of the necessitation relation between base and emergent and argues that emergentism entails a Humean account of causation and related relations. Then it presents arguments against emergentism, both as a wider metaphysic and as an account of consciousness. These maintain that emergentism makes implausible claims about how the world works. The paper also stresses the doctrine's contemporary relevance: most current property dualists endorse views effectively identical to classical emergentism less its historical commitment to novel emergent forces.