4 papers in the library · 74 citations · publishing 1977-2014
Philosophy April 1, 1978 Kathleen V. Wilkes 36 citations
Commissurotomy surgery, which severs the corpus callosum, has led some philosophers to argue that it splits consciousness and the mind, threatening the ordinary concept of a person. This paper assesses that threat and argues it is overestimated. The author begins the main argument in section III, while section II describes the operation and its effects for those unfamiliar with them.
Philosophy July 1, 2014 Tyler Burge 25 citations
Representational mind—the capacity for states with veridicality conditions—originates in arthropods, the simplest animals known to exhibit perceptual constancies and perception as a natural psychological kind. Perception, the most primitive representational state, involves objectification and is recognized by perceptual psychology. Consciousness is neither necessary nor sufficient for perception, and its evolutionary beginnings remain scientifically unknown. The argument distinguishes a psychologically distinctive notion of representation from information-based, causal, or functional notions, concluding that representational psychology begins with arthropods.
Philosophy October 1, 2013 Patrick Lewtas 13 citations
Emergentism, the idea that higher-level properties arise from lower-level ones in a way that is not fully reducible, is often defined in epistemological terms, which leads to confusion about its metaphysical validity. This paper offers purely metaphysical definitions of emergentism and property emergence, examining the necessitation relation between base and emergent properties. It argues that emergentism implies a Humean view of causation. The paper then presents arguments against emergentism, both as a general metaphysics and as an account of consciousness, claiming it makes implausible claims about how the world works. It notes that most current property dualists hold views effectively identical to classical emergentism, minus its historical commitment to novel emergent forces.
Philosophy January 1, 1977 Gareth B. Matthews
In L. Frank Baum's Ozma of Oz, the mechanical man Tik-Tok can think, speak, and act but is not considered alive, illustrating a distinction between functional intelligence and life. The story presents a character who performs all cognitive and physical actions yet lacks the quality of being alive, a distinction accepted by all characters.