Representational mind—the capacity for states with veridicality conditions—originates in arthropods, the simplest animals known to exhibit perceptual constancies and perception as a natural psychological kind. Perception, the most primitive representational state, involves objectification and is recognized by perceptual psychology. Consciousness is neither necessary nor sufficient for perception, and its evolutionary beginnings remain scientifically unknown. The argument distinguishes a psychologically distinctive notion of representation from information-based, causal, or functional notions, concluding that representational psychology begins with arthropods.
In an interview, Tyler Burge discusses perceptual anti-individualism, the view that the identity of many mental kinds depends on the creature's relations to the physical or social environment. He explains that this framework underpins his theory of perceptual representation and was implicitly assumed by perceptual psychology. Burge contrasts his approach with classic representational theories of perceptual experience, reductive theories of mental content, and theories of phenomenal consciousness, elaborating on the main tenets and philosophical underpinnings of his position.