Anti-Individualism and Perceptual Representation
Tyler Burge, Carlos Muñoz-suárez
Europe's Journal of Psychology December 5, 2014 DOI: 10.5964/ejop.v10i4.767 via DOAJ
Summary
AI-generated from the abstractIn an interview, Tyler Burge discusses perceptual anti-individualism, the view that the identity of many mental kinds depends on the creature's relations to the physical or social environment. He explains that this framework underpins his theory of perceptual representation and was implicitly assumed by perceptual psychology. Burge contrasts his approach with classic representational theories of perceptual experience, reductive theories of mental content, and theories of phenomenal consciousness, elaborating on the main tenets and philosophical underpinnings of his position.
Study at a glance
| Characteristics | Interview Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Keywords | Perceptual representation Anti-individualism Psychological explanation Philosophical psychology Psychology of perception |
| Citations | 1 |
| Key finding | Perceptual anti-individualism, which ties mental kind individuation to environmental relations, provides a framework that perceptual psychology implicitly assumed. |
Abstract
Tyler Burge's anti-individualism – the view that individuating many of a creature's mental kinds is necessarily dependent on relations that the creature bears to the physical, or in some cases social, environment – backs his theory of perceptual representation, i.e. perceptual anti-individualism. Perceptual anti-individualism articulates a framework that, according to Burge, perceptual psychology assumed without articulation. In this interview, Burge talks about the main tenets and underpinnings of perceptual anti-individualism in relation to classic representational theories of perceptual experience, reductive theories of mental content, theories of phenomenal consciousness, and other associated topics.