The Goldilocks Dilemma: Commentary on Josh Weisberg’s Explanatory Optimism about the Hard Problem of Consciousness
Journal of Consciousness Studies August 1, 2025 DOI: 10.53765/20512201.32.7.175
Summary
AI-generated from the abstractA commentary challenges Josh Weisberg's attempt to debunk the hard problem of consciousness through his automated compression theory (ACT). Weisberg argues that consciousness appears to have exceptional properties inexplicable by science, but ACT provides an easy explanation showing these properties are illusory. The commentary presents the Goldilocks dilemma: either Weisberg's account fails to capture what makes consciousness seem exceptional, or if it does capture it, then ACT cannot adequately explain why consciousness would appear exceptional if it were not. The dilemma suggests it is difficult for explanatory optimists to find a specification of consciousness's exceptional properties that is neither too small to capture exceptionalness nor too big to be debunked.
Study at a glance
| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key finding | Weisberg's automated compression theory faces a Goldilocks dilemma: either it fails to capture the exceptional features of consciousness or it cannot adequately debunk why consciousness seems exceptional. |
Abstract
In Explanatory Optimism about the Hard Problem of Consciousness, Josh Weisberg attempts to debunk the hard problem of consciousness. The hard problem arises from the thought that consciousness has exceptional properties inexplicable by science. Defending what he calls the automated compression theory (ACT), Weisberg argues that we have an easy explanation of consciousness that does not require us to posit any exceptional properties but yet fully accounts for why we would be so naturally led to think that such exceptional properties exist. In this commentary, I offer a challenge to Weisberg’s argument that is best seen as taking the form of a dilemma: either his account of the properties of consciousness do not adequately capture its exceptional features, or, if it does, then ACT does not adequately explain why consciousness would seem exceptional even if it weren???t (that is, ACT fails to do the debunking work Weisberg wants it to do). Call this the Goldilocks dilemma, as the problem arises from the fact that it???s hard for the explanatory optimist to find a specification of the exceptional properties of consciousness that are just right — either they are too ‘small’ to capture exceptionalness, or they are too ‘big’ to be debunked.