What of the Hard Problem?

The subjective quality of a conscious experience can be understood by how similar it is to all other possible experiences. Similarity relationships are implicitly assessed through the structure of mammalian sensory cortices, allowing effortless knowledge of what an experience is like. This view aligns with perceptual reality monitoring: subjective experience occurs when qualitative sensory information acquires assertoric force. Metaphysical theories generally do not account for these qualitative aspects of consciousness better and may hinder scientific progress.

Study at a glance

Abstract

Abstract This chapter argues that the subjective quality of a conscious experience can be understood in terms of how similar it is to all other possible experiences. We discuss how these similarity relationships can be implicitly and conveniently assessed, given the structure of the mammalian sensory cortices. These mechanisms allow the subject to “know”, without effort, what an experience is like. I will flesh out how this mental quality space view fits well with the theory of perceptual reality monitoring introduced in Chapter 7: subjective experience happens when qualitative sensory information acquires an assertoric force. We end by discussing why metaphysical theories generally don’t fare better in accounting for these qualitative aspects of consciousness, and may just hinder scientific progress.