The Phi measure of integrated information is not well-defined for general physical systems
Adam B. Barrett, Pedro A. M. Mediano
arXiv Preprint Archive February 12, 2019 via arXiv
Summary
AI-generated from the abstractIntegrated Information Theory (IIT) defines consciousness as a fundamental property of physical systems, measured by the quantity Phi. For IIT to be credible, Phi must be uniquely defined and always well-defined. This article identifies three ways in which the current formulation of Phi fails these standards, making the measure ambiguous or ill-defined in certain cases, and discusses potential solutions to address these foundational issues.
Study at a glance
| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Topics | Philosophy of mind |
| Keywords | Q-bio.nc Consciousness theory Awareness Sentience Mind |
| Key finding | The current formulation of Phi in Integrated Information Theory is not uniquely defined and can be ill-defined, undermining its claim to measure consciousness. |
Abstract
According to the Integrated Information Theory of Consciousness, consciousness is a fundamental observer-independent property of physical systems, and the measure Phi of integrated information is identical to the quantity or level of consciousness. For this to be plausible, there should be no alternative formulae for Phi consistent with the axioms of IIT, and there should not be cases of Phi being ill-defined. This article presents three ways in which Phi, in its current formulation, fails to meet these standards, and discusses how this problem might be addressed.