The assumptions that restrain us from understanding consciousness
arXiv Preprint Archive June 26, 2025 via arXiv
Summary
AI-generated from the abstractThe science of consciousness has made progress, but key questions remain unanswered. Moving forward may require revising fundamental assumptions rather than relying on the same theoretical commitments. A key assumption is that neural correlates of consciousness are found at the level of spiking responses, but this should not be taken for granted. Another assumption is that the computations underlying consciousness are close to being understood, yet they may be far more complex than current theories envision, and there is little reason to think consciousness is an abstract computation. Consciousness research could benefit from investigating internal changes like aha-moments. The piece questions what theories the science of consciousness truly needs.
Study at a glance
| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Topics | Philosophy of mind |
| Keywords | Q-bio.nc Consciousness research Science of consciousness Mind science |
| Key finding | Progress in the science of consciousness may require revising fundamental assumptions, such as that neural correlates are found at the level of spiking responses and that consciousness is an abstract computation, and exploring internal changes like aha-moments. |
Abstract
The science of consciousness has been successful over the last decades. Yet, it seems that some of the key questions remain unanswered. Perhaps, as a science of consciousness, we cannot move forward using the same theoretical commitments that brought us here. It might be necessary to revise some assumptions we have made along the way. In this piece, I offer no answers, but I will question some of these fundamental assumptions. We will try to take a fresh look at the classical question about the neural and explanatory correlates of consciousness. A key assumption is that neural correlates are to be found at the level of spiking responses. However, perhaps we should not simply take it for granted that this assumption holds true. Another common assumption is that we are close to understanding the computations underlying consciousness. I will try to show that computations related to consciousness might be far more complex than our current theories envision. There is little reason to think that consciousness is an abstract computation, as traditionally believed. Furthermore, I will try to demonstrate that consciousness research could benefit from investigating internal changes of consciousness, such as aha-moments. Finally, I will ask which theories the science of consciousness really needs.