An evidence-based critical review of the mind-brain identity theory.

Summary

The causal relationship between phenomenal consciousness, mentation, and brain states remains debated. Material monism, which views consciousness and mind as brain epiphenomena, relies on a 'loss-of-function lesion premise': brain lesions and neurochemical changes cause cognitive impairment and altered consciousness, suggesting mind-brain identity. Dualism or idealism, however, regards consciousness and mind as distinct from cerebral activity, pointing to the ineffable nature of subjective experience. This review examines neuroscientific findings that question phenomenal experience as an emergent property of brain activity, arguing that material monism's premise commits a correlation-causation fallacy. Considered integrally, these findings support an ontology where mind and consciousness are primal phenomena.

Study at a glance

Abstract

In the philosophy of mind, neuroscience, and psychology, the causal relationship between phenomenal consciousness, mentation, and brain states has always been a matter of debate. On the one hand, material monism posits consciousness and mind as pure brain epiphenomena. One of its most stringent lines of reasoning relies on a 'loss-of-function lesion premise,' according to which, since brain lesions and neurochemical modifications lead to cognitive impairment and/or altered states of consciousness, there is no reason to doubt the mind-brain identity. On the other hand, dualism or idealism (in one form or another) regard consciousness and mind as something other than the sole product of cerebral activity pointing at the ineffable, undefinable, and seemingly unphysical nature of our subjective qualitative experiences and its related mental dimension. Here, several neuroscientific findings are reviewed that question the idea that posits phenomenal experience as an emergent property of brain activity, and argue that the premise of material monism is based on a logical correlation-causation fallacy. While these (mostly ignored) findings, if considered separately from each other, could, in principle, be recast into a physicalist paradigm, once viewed from an integral perspective, they substantiate equally well an ontology that posits mind and consciousness as a primal phenomenon.