Consciousness and Intentionality

Summary

Intentionality, the 'aboutness' of mental states, and phenomenal consciousness, the qualitative experience of those states, have traditionally been viewed as distinct. However, recent philosophical discourse suggests that these two features may be closely related. The favored perspective presented is a version of phenomenal intentionality theory, which posits that the most basic form of intentionality stems from phenomenal consciousness.

Study at a glance

Abstract

Philosophers traditionally recognize two key features of mental states: intentionality and phenomenal consciousness. To a first approximation, intentionality is the ‘aboutness’ of mental states, and phenomenal consciousness is the felt, experiential, qualitative, or ‘what it’s like’ aspect of mental states. In the past few decades, these features have been widely assumed to be distinct and independent. But several philosophers have recently challenged this assumption, arguing that intentionality and consciousness are importantly related. This chapter overviews the key views on the relationship between consciousness and intentionality and describes our favored view, which is a version of the phenomenal intentionality theory, the view that the most fundamental kind of intentionality arises from phenomenal consciousness.