Dualism

Summary

Dualism and physicalism are two metaphysical views about consciousness, both influenced by epistemic concerns. Contrary to common belief, dualists do not solely rely on armchair reflection, nor do physicalists rely exclusively on empirical data; both perspectives use a mix of empirical evidence and conceptual analysis. The chapter aims to clarify that both views seek compatibility with scientific findings while extending beyond what empirical science alone can provide.

Study at a glance

Abstract

Dualism is a metaphysical view about the nature of consciousness, driven largely by epistemic concerns. Dualism’s chief rival, physicalism about consciousness, is also a metaphysical view driven largely by epistemic concerns. A primary goal of this chapter is to correct a widespread misunderstanding about how epistemic issues shape the debate between dualists and physicalists. According to a familiar picture, dualism is motivated by armchair reflection, and dualists accord special significance to our ways of conceptualizing consciousness and the physical. In contrast, physicalists favor empirical data over armchair reflection, and physicalism is a relatively straightforward extension of scientific theorizing. This familiar picture is inaccurate. Both dualist and physicalist arguments employ a combination of empirical data and armchair reflection; both rely on considerations of how we conceptualize certain phenomena; and both aim to establish views that are compatible with scientific results but go well beyond the deliverances of empirical science. The discussion highlights these neglected epistemic parallels between dualism and physicalism.