Perceptual consciousness and cognitive access: an introduction.

Summary

The article addresses the challenge of understanding how subjective experiences, like seeing colors or hearing sounds, relate to brain processes. It discusses whether the neural basis of perceptual consciousness operates independently from cognitive access mechanisms that allow us to report and reflect on these experiences. The aim is to critically analyze current findings, highlight methodological issues, and suggest new approaches in consciousness research.

Abstract

The problem of perceptual consciousness-the question of how our subjective experiences (colours as we see them; sounds as we hear them; tastes, etc., as we feel them) could be accounted for in terms of brain processes-is often regarded as the greatest unsolved mystery of our times. In recent literature, one of the most pressing questions in this regard is whether the neural basis of perceptual consciousness is independent of the neural basis of cognitive access mechanisms that make reporting and reflecting on conscious experiences possible. The Theme Issue focuses on this central problem of consciousness research and aims to contribute to the field by critically discussing state-of-the-art empirical findings, identifying methodological problems and proposing novel approaches.This article is part of the theme issue 'Perceptual consciousness and cognitive access'.

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