CAUSAL-PATTERN THEORIES OF CONSCIOUSNESS: A CHALLENGE AND A META-CAUSAL RESPONSE
Manuscrito December 17, 2024 Peer reviewed DOI: 10.1590/0100-6045.2024.v47n1.jb via DOAJ
Summary
The article challenges consciousness theories that require specific causal patterns in conscious processes, arguing that these patterns are not necessary for the effects on an organism's other aspects. It suggests that the property of being conscious may be unnecessary for explaining these effects and poses questions about the implications for individual organisms and the evolution of consciousness. The author proposes the concept of meta-causation, which allows conscious processes to act as independent causes of effects elsewhere.
Study at a glance
| Key finding | The paper introduces meta-causation to address how conscious processes can independently cause effects, challenging existing theories of consciousness. |
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Abstract
Abstract This article presents a challenge concerning the causal efficacy of causal processes, distinct from the much-discussed causal-exclusion problem. The new challenge is to consciousness theories that require conscious processes to involve causation patterned in some specific way. This broad, diverse class includes prominent theories such as the Integrated Information Theory, Global Workspace theories and a type of Higher-Order Thought theory. The challenge arises because the causal pattern is not itself required for the effects the processes have on the organism’s other aspects. Hence, the processes’ property of being conscious is dispensable in accounting for those effects. The theories are challenged to show how this does not constitute an operational problem for individual organisms or a problem as regards explaining the evolution of consciousness. The paper explains how the challenge can be met by the radical move of introducing meta-causation: causation that acts on causation instances themselves. This allows the instances of causation in conscious processes, as entities in their own right, to be causes of effects elsewhere. The paper also summarizes the author’s previously published motivation for proposing meta-causation, as the basis of consciousness itself. The present paper further supports this view.