Varieties of the extended self.

Summary

The article analyzes recent discussions on the concept of the extended self, highlighting that the boundaries of self are fluid and influenced by biological, artifactual, and sociocultural factors. It differentiates between minimal self, person, and narrative self while reviewing arguments from various fields about how aspects like embodiment and cognition extend the self. Additionally, it addresses criticisms of the extended self and explores its connections with the extended mind, concluding with implications for future research.

Study at a glance

Abstract

This article provides an overview and analysis of recent work on the extended self, demonstrating that the boundaries of selves are fluid, shifting across biological, artifactual, and sociocultural structures. First, it distinguishes the notions of minimal self, person, and narrative self. Second, it surveys how philosophers, psychologists, and cognitive scientists argue that embodiment, cognition, emotion, consciousness, and moral character traits can be extended and what that implies for the boundaries of selves. It also reviews and responds to various criticisms and counterarguments against the extended self. The main focus is on the link between the extended mind and extended self, which has received the most attention in recent literature. But accounts of the extended self developed independently of the extended mind are also briefly discussed. This article ends by drawing out some of the conceptual, methodological, and normative implications of the extended self and suggesting some directions for future research.

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