Knowing Blue: Early Buddhist Accounts of Non-Conceptual Sense
Philosophy East and West January 1, 2018 Peer reviewed DOI: 10.1353/pew.2018.0075 via OpenAlex
Summary
Non-conceptual cognition in post-Dignāga Buddhist epistemology is seen as a fundamental aspect of all cognitive states. Earlier Buddhist interpretations suggested that the five senses directly perceive objects, while only the mind consciousness can make conceptual distinctions. An example illustrates this: visual consciousness recognizes 'blue' but not the statement 'this is blue.' The article examines challenges faced by early Buddhist scholars in understanding immediate, non-conceptual cognition.
Study at a glance
| Key finding | Early Buddhist exegetes struggled to understand the concept of immediate, non-conceptual cognition. |
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Abstract
In post-Dignāga Buddhist epistemology, non-conceptual cognition (nirvikalpajñāna) comes to be construed as a sort of pre-reflective and self-intimating feature of all states of cognition. In earlier Buddhist Ābhidharmika exegesis, however, the closest candidate for non-conceptual cognition is the notion that the five sense consciousnesses apprehend their object-supports directly, as opposed to the sixth consciousness—mind consciousness (manovij ñāna)—which alone has the capacity for conceptual discrimination. In an oft -repeated example, visual consciousness is said to know "blue" but not "this is blue"; it is mind consciousness that knows "this is blue." This article explores the diffi culties that early Buddhist exegetes encountered as they tried to make sense of immediate, non-conceptual cognition.