(Dis)confirming theories of consciousness and their predictions: towards a Lakatosian consciousness science
Neuroscience of Consciousness January 1, 2024 Peer reviewed DOI: 10.1093/nc/niae012 via Semantic Scholar
Summary
Adversarial collaborations testing rival theories of consciousness are becoming more common. This paper argues that Lakatos's philosophy of science can help interpret these experiments by providing criteria for theory-appraisal: distinguishing prediction from accommodation, assessing structural relevance of predictions, and evaluating boldness. A Lakatosian model offers both normative and descriptive benefits, emphasizing theories' historical development, logical structure, and relationship with background knowledge.
Study at a glance
| Design | review |
|---|---|
| Key finding | A Lakatosian model of theory-appraisal, based on three criteria, can help consciousness scientists interpret adversarial collaborations and develop a confirmation-theoretic approach to evaluating theories. |
Abstract
Abstract The neuroscience of consciousness is undergoing a significant empirical acceleration thanks to several adversarial collaborations that intend to test different predictions of rival theories of consciousness. In this context, it is important to pair consciousness science with confirmation theory, the philosophical discipline that explores the interaction between evidence and hypotheses, in order to understand how exactly, and to what extent, specific experiments are challenging or validating theories of consciousness. In this paper, I examine this intricate relationship by adopting a Lakatosian lens. I propose that Lakatos’ philosophy of science can aid consciousness scientists to better interpret adversarial collaborations in consciousness science and, more generally, to develop a confirmation-theoretic model of theory-appraisal in this field. I do so by suggesting that such a model be built upon three Lakatos-inspired criteria for assessing the relationship between empirical evidence and theoretical predictions: (i) the model should represent the ‘distinction between prediction and accommodation’; (ii) the model should represent the ‘structural relevance’ of predictions; (iii) the model should represent the ‘boldness’ of the predictions. I argue that a Lakatosian model of theory-appraisal has both normative and descriptive virtues, and can move the debate forward by acknowledging that theory-appraisal needs to consider the diachronic development of theories, their logical structure, and their relationship with background beliefs and knowledge.