Consciousness operationalized, a debate realigned.
Peter Carruthers, Bénédicte Veillet
Consciousness and cognition October 1, 2017 Peer reviewed DOI: 10.1016/j.concog.2017.07.008 via PubMed
Summary
The paper argues that the debate over cognitive phenomenology should focus on whether there are conceptual or propositional experiences, not on sensory versus cognitive ones. It defends three types of non-sensory, non-conceptual experiences: valence (feeling good or bad), a sense of approximate number, and a sense of elapsed time. The authors propose that the test for irreducible phenomenology is the presence of explanatory gaps, and they clarify how their earlier proposal has been misunderstood.
Study at a glance
| Key finding | The correct alignment for the cognitive phenomenology debate is between non-conceptual and conceptual or propositional phenomenology, with three varieties of non-sensory non-conceptual phenomenology defended: valence, a sense of approximate number, and a sense of elapsed time. |
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Abstract
This paper revisits the debate about cognitive phenomenology. It elaborates, defends, and improves on our earlier proposal for resolving that debate, according to which the test for irreducible phenomenology is the presence of explanatory gaps. After showing how proposals like ours have been misunderstood or misused by others, we deploy our operationalization to argue that the correct way to align the debate over cognitive phenomenology is not between sensory and (alleged) cognitive phenomenology, but rather between non-conceptual and (alleged) conceptual or propositional phenomenology. In doing so we defend three varieties of non-sensory (amodal)1 non-conceptual phenomenology: valence, a sense of approximate number, and a sense of elapsed time.