How Things Take Up Space: A Grounded Theory of Presence and Lived Space
Aleš Oblak, Asena Boyadzhieva, Jaya Caporusso, Borut Škodlar, Jurij Bon
The Qualitative Report November 20, 2022 Peer reviewed DOI: 10.46743/2160-3715/2022.5762 via OpenAlex
Summary
Presence—the sense of being in a place or that an object is real—is not itself a sensory experience but a disembodied sense of solidity that draws on all available sensory knowledge. Based on 117 phenomenological interviews with 14 participants sampled transdiagnostically, presence in lived space can shift in both positive (e.g., sexual intimacy) and negative (e.g., psychopathology) circumstances. This finding suggests that delusions may arise from sensory alterations rather than changes in belief, and that presence need not match objective reality, supporting the idea that presence is an amodal aspect of consciousness.
Study at a glance
| Design | qualitative study |
|---|---|
| Sample size | 14 |
| Population | participants sampled transdiagnostically across positive and negative circumstances |
| Key finding | Presence is a disembodied sense of solidity comprised of all available sensory knowledge but not present in any single sensory modality. |
Abstract
In cognitive science, it is unclear what precisely presence (both in the sense of objecthood and immersion) refers to in lived experience. The present study addresses the research question of what the relationship between presence is and lived space. A hundred and seventeen phenomenological interviews were conducted with 14 participants. We sampled their experience in a transdiagnostic manner. That is, we observed how the experience of presence changes both in circumstances appraised as positive (e.g., sexual intimacy) and negative (e.g., psychopathology). Our grounded theory suggests that presence is a phenomenon that is comprised of all available sensory knowledge, however, it itself is not present in any one sensory modality. Presence takes the form of a disembodied sense of solidity. Our findings can be related to the notion of transmodality in contemporary qualitative phenomenology (i.e., the idea that there are some aspects of experience that can be readily translated from one sensory modality to another. Further, how presence (in its capacity as immersion) is related to lived space can shed further light on the formation of delusions, suggesting that it is based on sensory alterations rather than changes in belief. Finally, the observation that presence as it appears in lived space need not perfectly correspond to the objective situation, can elucidate extant discussion on whether presence is an amodal aspect of consciousness.