If insects have phenomenal consciousness, could they suffer?

Summary

This commentary on Klein & Barron's proposal that insects may have phenomenal consciousness explores whether insects might also experience affective consciousness, including suffering. The authors note that while the skeptic's view that neural and behavioral parallels between humans and insects need not imply consciousness cannot be falsified, if Klein & Barron are correct, it is important to consider the contents of insect consciousness. They discuss whether affect-induced modulation of decision-making, known as cognitive bias in humans, can be observed in animals as a novel indicator of emotion and welfare.

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Abstract

: Klein & Barron’s (K & B’s) suggestion that insects have the capacity for phenomenal consciousness is a refreshing and challenging departure from the cautious and agnostic stance that is taken by many researchers when considering this possibility. It is impossible to falsify the sceptic’s view that neural and behavioural parallels between humans and insects need not imply either similar conscious experience or even any phenomenal consciousness in insects at all. But if K & B are right, it is important to consider the possible contents of insect consciousness. Here we discuss whether affective consciousness, with its implications for potential suffering, might also be part of the simulated perceptual conscious world that K & B propose. are influenced by affective state. In humans, affect-induced modulation of decision-making leads to “cognitive bias.” Can it be observed in animals and used as a novel indicator of animal affect (emotion) and welfare?

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