FREE YOUR MIND: BUDDHISM, CAUSALITY, AND THE FREE WILL PROBLEM
Zygon® June 1, 2020 Peer reviewed DOI: 10.1111/zygo.12586 via OpenAlex
Summary
Buddhism's doctrines of momentariness, dependent arising, and no-self challenge common conceptions of free will as the freedom to do otherwise or self-determination. The article examines whether mental autonomy cultivated through meditation is compatible with these doctrines, and whether Buddhist antisubstantialist metaphysics can support personal agency, self-control, and moral responsibility. It also considers the relevance of physical and neurobiological accounts to free will debates.
Study at a glance
| Design | theoretical or philosophical paper |
|---|---|
| Key finding | The article argues that Buddhist doctrines of momentariness, dependent arising, and no-self are compatible with a conception of mental autonomy grounded in meditative cultivation, and that Buddhism has resources to account for personal agency, self-control, and moral responsibility. |
Abstract
Abstract The problem of free will is associated with a specific and significant kind of control over our actions, which is understood primarily in the sense that we have the freedom to do otherwise or the capacity for self‐determination. Is Buddhism compatible with such a conception of free will? The aim of this article is to address three critical issues concerning the free will problem: (1) what role should accounts of physical and neurobiological processes play in discussions of free will? (2) Is a conception of mental autonomy grounded in practices of meditative cultivation compatible with the three cardinal Buddhist doctrines of momentariness, dependent arising, and no‐self? (3) Are there enough resources in Buddhism, given its antisubstantialist metaphysics, to account for personal agency, self‐control, and moral responsibility?