Can Autonomous Agents Without Phenomenal Consciousness Be Morally Responsible?
Philosophy & Technology July 11, 2021 Peer reviewed DOI: 10.1007/s13347-021-00462-7 via Semantic Scholar
Summary
Some philosophers argue that unconscious autonomous agents can be morally responsible, a view supported by a common line of reasoning called the Extension Argument. This paper contends that the argument, as currently formulated, fails to prove that such agents bear moral responsibility. The argument faces strong ethical objections and rests on shaky epistemological foundations, partly because its premises conflict with one another.
Study at a glance
| Design | theoretical or philosophical paper |
|---|---|
| Key finding | The Extension Argument is insufficient to establish that unconscious autonomous agents can be morally responsible, due to unresolved ethical objections and conflicting justifications among its premises. |
Abstract
It is an increasingly popular view among philosophers that moral responsibility can, in principle, be attributed to unconscious autonomous agents. This trend is already remarkable in itself, but it is even more interesting that most proponents of this view provide more or less the same argument to support their position. I argue that as it stands, the Extension Argument, as I call it, is not sufficient to establish the thesis that unconscious autonomous agents can be morally responsible. I attempt to show that the Extension Argument should overcome especially strong ethical considerations; moreover, its epistemological grounds are not too solid, partly because the justifications of its premises are in conflict.