Active inference, enactivism and the hermeneutics of social cognition.
Synthese January 1, 2018 Peer reviewed DOI: 10.1007/s11229-016-1269-8 via PubMed
Summary
The paper distinguishes three philosophical views on predictive models in neuroscience: predictive coding (internal Bayesian models and prediction error minimization), predictive processing (radical connectionism and simple embodiment), and predictive engagement (enactivist approaches). It examines active inference under each model and explores how this concept informs social cognition, specifically comparing Frith and Friston's neural hermeneutics with an enactivist hermeneutics alternative.
Study at a glance
| Design | theoretical or philosophical paper |
|---|---|
| Key finding | The paper distinguishes three philosophical views on predictive models and compares neural hermeneutics with enactivist hermeneutics in social cognition. |
Abstract
We distinguish between three philosophical views on the neuroscience of predictive models: predictive coding (associated with internal Bayesian models and prediction error minimization), predictive processing (associated with radical connectionism and 'simple' embodiment) and predictive engagement (associated with enactivist approaches to cognition). We examine the concept of active inference under each model and then ask how this concept informs discussions of social cognition. In this context we consider Frith and Friston's proposal for a neural hermeneutics, and we explore the alternative model of enactivist hermeneutics.