Pragmatism as the foundation of cognitive enactivism

Summary

Enactivism, a leading approach in embodied cognitive science, has long drawn on phenomenology but neglected its own roots in pragmatism. This paper argues that pragmatism anticipated many core enactivist ideas, especially the view that cognition arises from ongoing interaction between organisms and their environment, shaped by biological evolution and development. Both traditions emphasize the active role of the organism and its environment in forming cognition and share a neutral monist ontology. Pragmatism offers conceptual resources and methods to advance enactivist theory.

Study at a glance

Abstract

The current prevailing embodied cognitive science is essentially the result of the pragmatic turn of cognitive science, and enactivism is the epitome of this turn. For a long time, most advocates of enactivism have consciously regarded phenomenology as their important source of thought but ignored its pragmatic roots. In fact, there are many similarities between enactivism and pragmatism, and pragmatism has foreshadowed some core ideas and principles of enactivism. In particular, enactivism contains a pragmatic assumption that there is interaction between organisms and their environment, and cognitive ability is evolved and developed by organisms in the history of interactions with their environment. Their interpretations of cognition both rely on the theoretical support of biology and emphasize the basic role of organisms’ active capacities and environment in the formation of cognition. They hold a neutral monism position ontologically. Undoubtedly, pragmatism is the precursor of cognitive enactivism. Pragmatism not only provides rich conceptual resources for the development of enactivism, but also provides a unique perspective and method to solve some problems in its theory. Pragmatism is a rich mine for enactivists to further explore.

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