The structure of intentionality: insights and challenges for enactivism
Inquiry May 26, 2023 Peer reviewed DOI: 10.1080/0020174x.2023.2216753 via Semantic Scholar
Summary
Enactivism rejects representationalism but faces a tension over whether intentionality involves content. This paper clarifies that tension by examining how enactivists both affirm and deny that intentionality is contentful. It then contextualizes this issue by comparing two classic accounts: Husserl's theory of intentionality from the Logical Investigations and Peirce's triadic semiotics. The analysis shows how these philosophical frameworks help articulate and resolve the enactivist dilemma.
Study at a glance
| Design | theoretical or philosophical paper |
|---|---|
| Key finding | The paper identifies a tension within enactivism regarding the contentfulness of intentionality and uses Husserl's and Peirce's theories to clarify it. |
Abstract
ABSTRACT The purpose of the paper is twofold. It first aims at clarifying and developing an important tension within enactivism concerning the relations between intentionality and content, once representationalism has been abandoned. In which sense(s) do enactivists (still) say that intentionality is contentful and not contentful? Secondly, it puts this tension in perspective with two paradigmatic ways of defining the relations between intentional states and their objects: Husserl’s theory of intentionality in the Logical Investigations, and Charles Sanders Peirce’s triadic semiotics.