What Is It Like To Be in a Pure Perceptual State?
Análisis Filosófico November 8, 2024 Peer reviewed DOI: 10.36446/af.e1042 via DOAJ
Summary
The idea of pure perception—perception free from cognitive influence—is often defined by nonconceptual content, iconic format, and unique phenomenology. This paper argues that this notion is untenable. Empirical evidence from introspection, psychology, and neuroanatomy fails to support the existence of such states, and there are significant theoretical worries about the properties used to characterize them.
Study at a glance
| Design | theoretical or philosophical paper |
|---|---|
| Key finding | The idea of pure perception, defined as a state with nonconceptual content, iconic format, and unique phenomenology, is untenable because empirical evidence does not support the individuation of such states. |
Abstract
The idea of pure perception —perception without any cognitive influence— is central to the science and philosophy of perception. For many, to be in a pure perceptual state is to be in a state whose content is nonconceptual, whose format is iconic, and whose phenomenology is unique. This paper explores this possibility and finds that the idea of pure perception, at least when defined in these terms, is untenable. Besides significant specific worries derived from the properties characterizing these states, I have not found empirical grounds indicating the possibility of individuating these states: neither looking inside oneself (introspection), nor looking inside others (psychology), nor looking inside the brain (neuroanatomy), suggests the existence of pure perceptual mental states.