Suárez and Some Baroque Scotists on the Perceptual Self-Awareness
Anales del Seminario de Historia de la Filosofía September 30, 2022 Peer reviewed DOI: 10.5209/ashf.77923 via DOAJ
Summary
This article examines whether perceptual self-awareness of external sensations requires sensible species that represent those acts. It contrasts Aristotle's two views from On the Soul and On Sleep and Waking as the scholastic starting point, then analyzes accounts by Francisco Suárez, Bartholomeo Mastri and Bonaventura Belluto, and Hugh McCaghwell. The author shows that Suárez's view, unsupported by Scotus's text, is rejected by Mastri/Belluto and by McCaghwell in one conclusion, but that McCaghwell's second tenet is Suarezian, indicating positive reception of Suárez's philosophy among seventeenth-century Scotists.
Study at a glance
| Design | theoretical or philosophical paper |
|---|---|
| Key finding | McCaghwell's second tenet is Suarezian, showing that Suárez's philosophy of perception was positively received by seventeenth-century Scotists. |
Abstract
In this article I deal with the topic of perceptual self-awareness, focusing on whether a plausible account of sensory self-perception having exterior sensations as its objects requires sensible species representing these acts. I first introduce Aristotle’s two distinct views from On the Soul and On Sleep and Waking as defining the scholastic status quaestionis, then bring in Francisco Suárez’s (1548–1617), Bartholomeo Mastri’s (1602–1673) and Bonaventura Belluto’s (1600–1676), and Hugh McCaghwell’s (1571–1626) accounts. I show, first, that Suárez’s view, which cannot be substantiated by Scotus’s littera, is rejected by Mastri/Belluto and by McCaghwell in one of his conclusions. Second, I argue that McCaghwell’s second tenet is to be assessed as Suarezian. This shows that Suárez’s philosophy of perception was positively received also by seventeenth-century Scotists.