Descartes on the source of error: the Fourth Meditation and the Correspondence with Elisabeth
British Journal for the History of Philosophy October 20, 2022 DOI: 10.1080/09608788.2022.2132908 via Semantic Scholar
Summary
Descartes's Fourth Meditation blames indifference of the will for error, suggesting judgments are arbitrary, but his 1645 letter to Elisabeth instead identifies passions as the source of error by misrepresenting objects' value. This essay argues that the two accounts address different kinds of error—theoretical versus practical—and that Descartes extends the passion-based explanation to cover theoretical error as well. The earlier account does not make judgments arbitrary but fails to explain why we judge prematurely instead of continuing inquiry; the later account fills that gap. The first account is schematic partly because the Meditations had not yet systematically examined the nature of passions.
Study at a glance
| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Keywords | Philosophy |
| Citations | 1 |
| Key finding | Descartes's later account of passions as the source of error fills a lacuna in the Fourth Meditation's account of theoretical error by explaining why we judge prematurely. |
Abstract
ABSTRACT In the Fourth Meditation, Descartes famously treats the indifference of the will (roughly, ambivalence of reasons) as the source of error, which many read as oddly suggesting that the will judges arbitrarily. In his letter to Elisabeth dated 1st September 1645, however, he expressly takes passions to be the source of error, saying that passions move the will to judge erroneously by misrepresenting the value of objects. Although these two accounts focus on different kinds of error – theoretical and practical error, respectively – I argue that Descartes is best understood as extending the second account also to the source of theoretical error. On my reading, the first account does not imply that erroneous judgements are simply arbitrary, but it leaves out an explanation why we judge at the time we do, when we could (and should) continue to inquire insofar as we have not yet gathered sufficient evidence. The second account fills in this lacuna by giving an explanation in terms of passions. I further argue that the schematic nature of the first account is due partly to the structure of the Meditations, but mainly to the fact that Descartes has not yet systematically examined the nature of passions there.