Descartes's Fourth Meditation blames indifference of the will for error, suggesting judgments are arbitrary, but his 1645 letter to Elisabeth instead identifies passions as the source of error by misrepresenting objects' value. This essay argues that the two accounts address different kinds of error—theoretical versus practical—and that Descartes extends the passion-based explanation to cover theoretical error as well. The earlier account does not make judgments arbitrary but fails to explain why we judge prematurely instead of continuing inquiry; the later account fills that gap. The first account is schematic partly because the Meditations had not yet systematically examined the nature of passions.
The Cārvākas, an ancient Indian school of philosophy, defended an early form of materialism. Their views are contrasted with other philosophical traditions of the time, particularly those that posited non-material substances or a soul. The text examines the Cārvāka arguments and their place in the broader intellectual landscape of ancient India.
Dorothy Emmet's 1945 book The Nature of Metaphysical Thinking presents an account of perception aimed at rehabilitating metaphysics against logical positivism and verificationism, particularly A. J. Ayer's views. Emmet draws extensively on A. N. Whitehead and Henri Bergson rather than Russell or Moore, straddling the analytic-continental divide. Her philosophy of perception offers a way forward for metaphysics during a mid-twentieth-century crisis in British philosophy, and her ideas anticipate later movements in the philosophy of perception.